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1 Introduction
One of the most startling results in dynamic optimal tax theory is the Chamley (1986)-Judd
(1985) zero captial income tax theorem. Although working in somewhat di¤erent settings,
they draw the strikingly similar conclusions: capital should not be taxed in any steady state.
The economic intuition is that the distorting taxes on the capital income depress the savings
motives and hence reduce the stock of physical capital and do harm to economic growth. To
eliminate these unpleasant distortions, capital should go untaxed in the long run.
The Chamley-Judd result is derived in the standard neoclassical growth model. In this
paper, we want to introduce the status preferences (or wealth e¤ects or the spirit of capi-
talism)1 in the dynamic tax theory and reexamine the Chamley-Judd results. The reason
why we incorporate status preferences into the optimal tax theory is based on the following
two considerations. On one hand, in the optimal growth model, Cass (1965) establishes
that the net marginal product of per capita capital is equal to the time preference rate
(i.e., f 0 (kmg) = ), which is well known as the modied golden rule level of physical cap-
ital. Whereas Kurz (1968) and Zou (1994) derive a less marginal product of capital (i.e.,
f 0 (k) =    Uk=Uc <  = f
0 (kmg)) and hence a higher steady state level of physical cap-
ital (i.e., k > kmg), by incorporating the status preferences in the Cass model. Then we
want to ask whether the government should levy a positive capital tax for this new savings
motive. On the other hand, the status preferences have been used extensively in the liter-
ature to understand many puzzles in economics and nance, such as the Equity Premiun
Puzzle (EPP) (Bakshi and Chen, 1995; Smith, 2002; Boileau and Rebecca, 2007), savings
and wealth accumulation (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992; Zou, 1995), occupational
choice (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008), wealth distribution (Luo and Young, 2009), business
cycle (Boileau and Rebecca, 2007; Karnizova, 2010; Michaillat and Emmanuel, 2015), and
cross-country growth di¤erences (Kurz, 1968; Zou, 1994). We want to examine whether and
how the status preferences a¤ect the optimal capital taxation in the long run. The main
conclusions drawn in this paper overturn the Chamley-Judd results. It is shown that the
limiting capital tax is not zero generally and its sign depends completely on the specications
of the utility function rather than the production technology. Furthermore, the indenite-
ness of optimal capital income taxation is robust to those extended settings, including the
model with multiple physical capitals, the one with human capital and physical capital, and
the model with heterogeneous agents. Hence this research enriches the literature on nonzero
capital income taxation.
Now we present a literature review on both zero capital income taxes and nonzero ones.
It is well-known that the Chamley-Judd theorem stimulates a large body of work on this
topic. Economists have continued to take turns reinvestigating the Chamley-Judd results in
di¤erent settings and putting forth various intuitions to interpret it. Lucas (1990) recovers
the zero limiting capital tax result in a model with endogenous growth driven by endogenous
learning/human capital accumulation and quanties the welfare cost of capital taxation
for the U.S. economy. In a model with both physical and human capital, Jones, Manuelli
1The modeling strategy of putting capital/wealth into the utility function is named di¤erently as social
status/norms (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992; Luo and Young, 2009), wealth e¤ects (Kurz, 1968),
or the spirit of capitalism (Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Boileau and Braeu, 2007; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008;
Karnizova, 2010; Smith, 2001; Zou, 1994, 1995).
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and Rossi (1997) show that the optimality of a limiting zero tax applies to both labor
income and capital income, as long as the technology for accumulating human capital displays
constant return to scale in the stock of human capital and goods used. Correia (1996)
argues that zero capital tax hinges on a complete set of at-rate taxes for all production
factors which guarantees the perfect shifts of the long-run burden of capital taxation to
other production factors. When these other factors cannot be taxed directly, the optimality
of the zero tax rate on capital income disappears. Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1996) shows
that Chamleys result still holds in models with heterogeneous agents, endogenous growth,
small open economies or overlapping generations. By incorporating exogenous shocks to the
production function or government purchases, Zhu (1992) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1994) generalize the Chamley-Judd result to the stochastic version. Zhu (1992) establishes
that for some special utility functions, if there exists a stationary Ramsey equilibrium, the
Ramsey plan prescribes a zero ex ante capital tax rate that can be implemented by setting
a zero tax on capital income. However, except for those preferences, Zhu (1992) shows that
the ex ante capital tax rate should vary around zero. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994)
perform numerical simulations and conclude that there is a quantitative presumption that
the ex ante capital tax is approximately zero. Whereas others researchers overturns the
Chamley-Judd result by introducing particular mechanisms. Aiyagari (1995) shows that for
the Bewley-type models with incomplete insurance market and borrowing constraints, the
optimal tax rate on capital income is positive, even in the long run. The intuition behind a
positive capital income tax rate is as follows: because of incomplete insurance market, there
is a precautionary motive for accumulating capital. Furthermore, the possibility of being
borrowing-constrainted in some future periods leads agents to accumulate more capital.
Therefore, these two features lead to excess (i.e., greater-than-the-optimal level of) capital.
And a positive tax rate on capital income will be needed to reduce capital accumulation and
bring capital to the optimal level. In order to conrm the importance of complete taxation
for zero capital tax, Correia (1996) studies a case with an additional xed production factor
that cannot be taxed by the government and shows that if the tax system is incomplete, the
limiting value of optimal capital tax can be di¤erent from zero. Stiglitz (2018) constructs
two overlapping generations models to deny the desirability of a zero capital tax. In one
model with time separability but with non-separability between consumption and leisure,
capital taxation depends on the complementarity/substitutability of leisure during work
with retirement consumption. In the other two-class model with su¢ciently equalitarian
social welfare functions and su¢ciently high productivity of educational expenditures, it
derives a positive optimal capital tax. In reexamining the two models developed by Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) respectively by assuming constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA)
preferences, Straub and Werning (2018) establish that when the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) is below one, the economy converges towards a positive limit tax. The
economic intuition they provide for this result is based on the anticipatory savings e¤ects of
future tax rates: when the IES is less than one, any anticipated increase in taxes leads to
higher savings today, since the substitution e¤ect is relatively small and dominated by the
income e¤ects. To exploit such anticipatory e¤ects, the optimum involves an increasing path
for capital tax rates and converges to a positive value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze a representative-
agent model with status concerns and derive the formula for optimal capital tax. Then we
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extend it to the case with multiple physical capitals. In section 3, we introduce human
capital into the baseline model and derive the very simliar results. In section 4, we extend
the model to the case with heterogeneous agents. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 The baseline model with status concerns
2.1 Model setup
Consider a production economy with no uncertainty. An innitely lived representative house-
hold likes consumption, leisure and capital streams fct; lt; ktg
1
t=0 that give higher values of
1X
t=0
tu(ct; lt; kt); (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the time discount rate, ct  0, lt  0 and kt  0 are consumption,
leisure and physical capital stock at time t, respectively, and ui > 0, uii < 0, uij  0, for
i; j 2 fc; l; kg with i 6= j. The household is endowed with one unit of time per period that
can be used for leisure lt and labor nt:
lt + nt = 1: (2)
The single good is produced with labor nt and capital kt. Output can be consumed by
households, used by the government, or used to augment the capital stock. The resource
constraint is
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt) + (1  k)kt; (3)
where k 2 (0; 1) the depreciation rate of capital and fgg
1
t=0 is an exogenous sequence of
government purchases. We assume that a standard increasing and concave production func-
tion that exhibits constant return to scale. By Eulers theorem on homogeneous functions,
linear homogeneity of F implies F (kt; nt) = Fk(kt; nt)kt + Fn(kt; nt)nt.
Government. The government nances its stream of purchases fgtg
1
t=0 by levying at-
rate, time varying taxes on earnings from capital at rate  kt and earnings from labor at rate
nt . The government can also trade one-period bonds, sequential trading of which su¢ces to
accomplish any intertemporal trade in a world without uncertainty. Let Bt be government
indebtedness to the private sector, denominated in time t-goods, maturing at the beginning
of period t. The governments budget constraint is
gt = 
k
t rtkt + 
n
t wtnt +
Bt+1
Rt
 Bt; (4)
where rt and wt are the market-determined rental rate of capital and the wage rate for labor,
respectively, denominated in units of time t goods, and Rt is the gross rate of return on
one-period bonds held from t to t + 1. Interest earnings on bonds are assumed to be tax
exempt; this assumption is innocuous for bond exchanges between the government and the
private sector. We assume that the government can commit fully and credibly to future tax
rates and thus evade the issue of time-consistency raised in Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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Households. A representative household chooses fct; lt; kt+1; bt+1g
1
t=0 to maximizes expres-
sion (1) subject to the time allocation constraint (2) and the sequence of budget constraints
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1   kt )rtkt + (1  
n
t )wtnt + (1  k)kt + bt; (5)
for t  0, given k0 and b0. Here, bt is the real value of one-period government bond holdings
that mature at the beginning of period t, denominated in units of time t consumption.
Substituting the time allocation equation into the objective function, we construct the
following Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t

u(ct; 1  nt; kt) + t

(1   kt )rtkt + (1  
n
t )wtnt + bt  
bt+1
Rt
  ct   kt+1 + (1  k)kt

:
At an interior solution, the rst-order conditions with respect to ct; nt; kt+1 and bt+1 are
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uc(t) = t; (6)
ul(t) = t(1  
n
t )wt; (7)
t = 

uk(t+ 1) + t+1[(1  
k
t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
	
; (8)
t
Rt
= t+1: (9)
From equations (6) and (7), we have
ul(t)
uc(t)
= (1  nt )wt; (10)
which displays that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and leisure equals their
(after-tax) price ratio. Combining equations (6) and (8) yields us the consumption Euler
equation
uc(t) = 

uk(t+ 1) + uc (t+ 1) [(1  
k
t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
	
; (11)
in which the demand for status (uk > 0) is a new channel for savings.
3 Putting equation (9)
into (8) leads to the modied no-arbitrage condition
Rt =
(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k
1  uk(t+ 1)=uc (t)
; (12)
where a new positive term uk(t+ 1)=uc (t) is present in the denominator.
Firms. In each period, the representative rm takes (rt; wt) as given, rents capital and
labor from households, and maximizes prots,
F (kt; nt)  rtkt   wtnt:
2Let uc (t) and ul (t) denote the time t values of the derivatives of u (ct; lt) with respect to consumption
and leisure, respectively.
3This savings motive can be seen more clearly from the steady state version of equation (11) without
taxes, namely, Fk = 1= 1+k uk=uc, in which the new term uk=uc (> 0) decreases the marginal product
of capital and hence increases the steady state level of physical capital.
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The rst-order conditions for this problem are
rt = Fk(kt; nt); wt = Fn(kt; nt): (13)
In words, inputs should be employed until the marginal product of the last unit is equal to
its rental price. With constant return to scale, we get the standard result that pure prots
are zero.
2.2 Primal approach to the Ramsey problem
In this section, we examine the optimal taxes in the long run by utilizing the Primal approach
developed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and used by Lucas and Stokey (1983). For this
purpose we present the following useful denitions.
Denition 1 A competive equilibrium is an allocation fct; lt; nt; kt+1; bt+1g
1
t=0, a price sys-
tem fwt; rt; Rtg
1
t=0, and a government policy

gt; 
k
t ; 
n
t ; Bt+1
	1
t=0
such that (a) given
the price system and the government poicy, the allocation solves both the rms problem
and the households problem with bt = Bt for all t  0; (b) given the allocation and
the price system, the government policy satises the sequence of government budget
constraint (4) for all t  0; (3) the time allocation constraint (2) and the resource
constraint (3) are sased for all t  0.
There are many competitive equilibria, indexed by di¤erent government policies. This
multiplicity motivates the Ramsey problem.
Denition 2 Given k0, b0 and m0, the Ramsey problem is to choose a competitive equilib-
rium that maximizes expression (1).
We use the Primal approach to formulate the Ramsey problem by following the procedure
written by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012). For this purpose, we rstly substitute repeatedly
the ow budget constraint (5) to derive the households present-value budget constraint4
1X
t=0

q0t ct + q
0
t+1
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
kt+1

=
1X
t=0
q0t (1  
n
t )wtnt +
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0; (14)
where q0t 
Pt 1
i=0R
 1
i is the Arrow-Debreu price for t  1, with the numeraire q
0
0 = 1.
Let  be a Lagrange multiplier on the households present-value budget constraint (14).
The rst-order conditions for the households problem are
tuc (t) = q
0
t ; (15)
tul (t) = q
0
t (1  
n
t )wt; (16)
q0t = 
tuk (t+ 1) + q
0
t+1
 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  

: (17)
4Here we impose the transversality condition limT!+1 q
0
T
bT = 0.
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Using condition (15), its corresponding expression for t = 0, and the numeraire q00 = 1, we
express the Arrow-Debreu price q0t as
q0t = 
t uc (t)
uc (0)
: (18)
From equations (15) and (16), we obtain
(1  nt )wt =
ul (t)
uc (t)
; (19)
which is essentially equation (10). Substituting equation (15) into (17) yields us 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  

=
uc (t)  uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
: (20)
Substituting equations (18), (19), and (20) into the present-value budget constraint (14),
we derive the following implementability condition5
1X
t=0
t[uc(t)ct   ul(t)nt + uk(t+ 1)kt+1] = uc(0)f[(1  
k
0)r0 + 1  k]k0 + b0g  eA1: (21)
The Ramsey problem is to maximize expression (1) subject to equation (21) and the
resource constraint (3). We proceed by assuming that government expenditures are small
enough that the problem has a convex constraint set and that we can approach it using
Lagrangian methods. In particular, let  be the Lagrangian multiplier on equation (21) and
dene
U(t)  U(ct; nt; kt; ct+1; nt+1; kt+1;)  u(ct; 1 nt; kt)+[uc(t)ct ul(t)nt+uk(t+1)kt+1]:
Then we can form the Lagrangian
J =
1X
t=0
tfU(t) + t[F (kt; nt)  ct   gt   kt+1 + (1  k)kt]g    eA1;
where ftg
1
t=0 is a sequence of Lagrangian multipliers. The rst order conditions for this
problem are
ct : U4(t  1) = [t   U1(t)]; t  1 (22)
nt :  U5(t  1) = [U2(t) + tFn(t)]; t  1 (23)
kt+1 : t   U6(t) = fU3(t+ 1) + t+1[Fk(t+ 1) + 1  k]g; t  0 (24)
where
U1(t) = uc(t) + [ucc(t)ct + uc(t)  ulc(t)nt];
U2(t) =  ul(t) + [ ucl(t)ct + ull (t)nt   ul(t)];
U3(t+ 1) = uk(t+ 1) + [uck(t+ 1)ct+1   ulk(t+ 1)nt+1];
U4(t  1) = ukc(t)kt;
U5(t  1) =  ukl(t)kt;
U6(t) = [ukk(t+ 1)kt+1 + uk(t+ 1)]:
5The derivation of the implementability condition is placed in appendix A.
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Consider the special case in which there is a T  0 for which gt = g for all t  T . Assume
that there exists a solution to the Ramsey problem and that it converges to a time-invariant
allocation, so that c; n and k are constant after some time. Then we have the following
Theorem 1 Suppose the economy converges to an interior steady state in the model with
status concerns. The limiting taxes for both capital and labor income are indenite.
That is, they could be positive, negative or zero, which are determined completely by
the functional form of the utility function, namely,
 k
8<:
> 0
= 0
< 0
; if (uk1   uc3)
8<:
> 0
= 0
< 0
; n
8<:
> 0
= 0
< 0
, if (2   Fn1)
8<:
> 0
= 0
< 0
:
Proof The steady-state equations for equations (22)-(24) are
 = (1 + )uc + (uccc  ulcn+ ukck)| {z }
1
; (25)
Fn = (1 + )ul + (uclc  ulln+ uklk)| {z }
2
; (26)
[1  (Fk + 1  k)] = [(1 + )uk + (uckc  ulkn+ ukkk| {z })
3
]: (27)
From equations (25) and (26), we solve for (1 + ) = and = as follows:
(1 + )

=
2   Fn1
uc2   ul1
;


=
ucFn   ul
uc2   ul1
: (28)
From equation (11), we know that
Fk + 1  k =
1

 
uk
uc
+  kFk: (29)
Dividing the both sides of equation (27) by  and plugging (28) and (29) into it, we
obtain
 k =
1
ucFk
(ucFn   ul)
(uc2   ul1)| {z }
=

(uk1   uc3) : (30)
From equation(28), the term (ucFn   ul) = (uc2   ul1) = = is nonnegative, because
the Lagrange multiplier  is nonnegative, while the insatiable utility function implies
that  is strictly positive. Notice that uc and Fk are both strictly positive. Hence the
sign of the limiting capital income tax is determined completely by the sign of the term
(uk1   uc3). To examine the optimal labor income tax, we substitute (25) into (26),
rearrange the terms and obtain
ucFn   ul =

1 + 
(2   Fn1) : (31)
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Equations (10) and (13) give us
ucFn   ul = 
nucFn: (32)
Combining the above two equation leads to
n =
1
ucFn

1 + 
(2   Fn1) : (33)
Since uc > 0, Fn > 0 and the multiplier  is nonnegative, the limiting optimal labor
income tax depends on the value of the term in the bracket, listed in the theorem.
Theorem 1 tells that the limiting capital income tax is in general not zero, since the
term (uk1   uc3) is generally not equal to zero. It should be noted that the sign of the
optimal capital tax rate relies only on the specication of the utility function rather than the
production technology. If the consumer cares about the utility from both social status and
consumption, then more complex forces destroy the zero capital income taxation theorem.
Proposition 1 (Chamley, 1986) If there is no status concern (i.e., uk = 0), then the limiting
capital income tax is zero, i.e.,  k = 0, and the corresponding labor income tax is
nonnegative, i.e., n  0.
Proof If uk = 0, then the term uk1   uc3 equals zero and hence 
k = 0. Meanwhile,
equation (33) degenerates as
n =
1
ucFn

1 + 
[(ucl   Fnucc) c+ ( ull + Fnulc)n]  0;
which is nonnegative due to the assumptions uc > 0, Fn > 0, ucl  0, ucc < 0, ull < 0
and ulc  0. 
Proposition 1 replicates the zero limiting capital tax and nonnegative labor income tax
results developed by Chamley (1986). Whether the limiting labor income tax equals zero
depends on the initial conditions (k0 and b0) and the steam of government purchases fgtg
1
t=0.
For the large values of k0 and low values of b0 and fgtg
1
t=0, by raising 
k
0 and thereby increasing
the revenues from lump-sum taxation of k0, the government reduces its need to rely on future
distortionary taxation and hence the value of  falls. Acturally, the positive values of the
derivative
 
@J=@ k0 = uc (0)Fk (0) k0 > 0

for all  k0 imply that the government could set 
k
0
high enough to drive  down to zero. This would enable the government to set nt = 0 for all
t  0 and  kt = 0 for all t  1. In this case, the government should raise all revenues through
a time 0 capital levy, then lend the proceeds to the private sector and nance government
expenditures by the interest from the loan. However, with low values of k0 and high values of
b0 and fgtg
1
t=0, the government has to impose distortionary labor income tax together with
time 0 capital vevy to nance government expenditures, which pushes up  to be positive.
This point has been emphasized by Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) in a life cycle context and
by Lucas (1990) in a model with endogenous growth driven by endogenous human capital
accumulation.
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Corollary 1 Suppose that (1) the utility function is additively separable in its three argu-
ments: consumtion c, leisure l, and capital k, and (2) there is a positive correlation
between the elasticity of marginal utility for consumption and the one of marginal util-
ity for capital, i.e., uccc=uc = ukkk=uk, with  > 0. Then, if  > 1, then 
k < 0; if
 < 1, then  k < 0; and if  = 1, then  k = 0. For those additively separable utility
functions, the labor income tax is nonnegative in the limit.
Proof If the utility function is additively separable with respect to its three arguments, i.e.,
u(ct; lt; kt) = f(ct) + g (lt) + h (kt), then uij = 0, for i 6= j 2 fc; l; kg. In this case, we
have 1 = uccc and 3 = ukkk. Equation (30) turns out to
 k =
uk
Fk


(  1)
ukkk
uk
=
ukkk
Fk


(  1) ;
which asserts the results about the limiting capital tax stated in the corollary, since
we know that Fk > 0, ukk < 0,   0 and  > 0. Furthermore, the expression of the
limiting labor income tax turns out to
n =
1
ucFn

1 + 
( Fnuccc  ulln)  0,
which shows that the limiting labor income tax is nonnegative. 
Corollary 1 displays that if the marginal utility for consumption is more sensitive than the
one for capital, i.e.,  (= ( uccc=uc) = ( ukkk=uk)) > 1, then the government should subsidy
capital accumulation in the limit, namely,  k < 0; if the marginal utility for consumption
is less sensitive than the one of physical capital, i.e.,  < 1, then the government should
levy on capital income, namely,  k < 0; and if they have the same degree of sensitivity, i.e.,
 = 1, then a zero limiting tax applies to capital inome. For additively separable utilites,
the limiting labor income tax is always nonnegative.
In order to show the results displayed in Theorem 1 more clearly, we extend the baseline
model to include two types of physical capitals: one, kt with interest rate rt and depreciation
rate , is in the utility, and the other, t with interest rate r

t depreciation rate , is not. We
also assume that the production function of the economy, F (kt; t; nt), is linearly homogenous
on three production factors. It is shown in Proposition 2 that the limiting tax rate on rt of
physical capital with status concerns is indenite and the one on rt of other physical capitals
without status concerns is zero.
Proposition 2 (Two Types of Physical Capitals) If the steady state exists in the extended
model with two types of physical capitals, then the limiting tax on capital with status
concerns is indenite and pinned down by equation (30), the limiting tax on capital
without status concerns equals zero, and the limiting tax on labor income is determined
by equation (33).6
6Note that the partial derivatives of the prodcution function in the tax equations depend on . That is,
Fn = Fn (k; ; n), Fk = Fk (k; ; n), and F = F (k; ; n). We omit the proof of Proposition 2, which is very
similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The proof is available upon request.
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3 Human capital and physical capital
In a model with human capital, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) show that the optimality
of a limiting zero tax applies to both labor income and capital income, as long as the
technology for accumulating human capital displays constant return to scale in the stock of
human capital and goods used. In this section, we extend the baseline model with status
concerns by allowing the same human capital technology as Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997),
and show that zero limiting tax applies to human capital but not to physical capital.
We postulate that human capital accumulation follows
ht+1 = (1  h)ht +H (xht; ht; nht) ; (34)
where h 2 (0; 1) is the rate at which human capital depreciates, and the function H ()
describes how new human capital is created with the ow of inputs coming from current
output xht, the stock of human capital ht, and raw labor nht. The idea that the accumulation
of human captical is an internal activity using market goods as well as human capital and
labor appears in Heckman (1976) and is standard in the labor economics literature.7 Human
capital is in turn used to produce e¢ciency units of labor et,
et =M (xmt; ht; nmt) ;
where xmt and nmt are the market good and raw labor used in the process. It is assumed that
both H and M are linearly homogeneous in market goods (xjt; j = h;m) and human capital
(ht), and twice continuously di¤erentiable with strictly decreasing and anywhere positive
marginal products of all factors.
The number of e¢ciency units of labor et replaces our earlier argument for labor nt in
the production function, F (kt; et). Applying Eulers theorem for the homogeneous functions
H, M , and F , we have that
H (xht; ht; nht) = Hx (t) xht +Hh (t)ht;
M (xht; ht; nht) = Mx (t) xht +Mh (t)ht;
F (kt; et) = Fk (t) kt + Fe (t) et:
The households preferences are still described by expression (1), with leisure lt = 1  nht  
nmt. The economys aggregate resource constraint is
ct + gt + kt+1 + xmt + xht = F (kt; et) + (1  k)kt: (35)
3.1 The Ramsey problem
The representative household maximizes the objective function (1), subject to the ow budget
constraint
(1 +  ct) ct+kt+1+(1 + 
m
t ) xmt+xht+
bt+1
Rt
= (1  kt )rtkt+(1 
n
t )wtet+(1 k)kt+bt; (36)
7This formulation has those popular specicaitons of Heckman (1976) (with H (x; h; n) = F (x; hn)) and
Lucas (1988) (with H (x; h; n) = hm (n)) as special cases.
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and human capital accumulation equation (34). The rst-order conditions for interior solu-
tions8 are then
ul (t)
uc (t)
=
Hn (t)
(1 +  ct)Hx (t)
=
(1  nt )wtMn (t)
(1 +  ct)
; (37)
(1  nt )wtMx (t) = 1 + 
m
t ; (38)
uc (t)
(1 +  ct)
= 
(
uk (t+ 1) +
uc (t+ 1) 
1 +  ct+1
  1   kt+1 rt+1 + 1  k
)
; (39)
uc (t)
(1 +  ct)Hx (t)
= 
uc (t+ 1) 
1 +  ct+1
  1  nt+1wt+1Mh (t+ 1) + Hh (t+ 1) + 1  hHx (t+ 1)

; (40)
uc (t)
(1 +  ct)
= Rt
uc (t+ 1) 
1 +  ct+1
 ; (41)
Rt =
(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k
1  uk(t+ 1) (1 +  ct) =uc (t)
: (42)
Optimality requires that the last unit of nal goods has the same marginal contributions on
consumption and human capital production and the last unit of time has the same marginal
contributions on utility maximization, producing human capital or generating e¤ective labor
forces, shown in Equations (37). Equations (38) shows that the (net) marginal product value
of the market good is equal to its marginal cost (i.e., after-tax price). Both (39) and (41)
are consumption Euler equations with the new term uk (t+ 1) with social status concerns.
Equation (42) is the modied no-arbitrage condition for portfolio choices.
The present-value budget constraint of the representative consumer is derived as
1X
t=0
(
q0t (1 + 
c
t) ct+
q0t+1
uk(t+1)(1+ct+1)
uc(t+1)
kt+1
)
=
 P1
t=0 q
0
t [(1  
n
t )wtet   (1 + 
m
t ) xmt   xht]
+
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0

: (43)
The optimal path of the Lagrange multiplier t tells that t = 0
 tq0t . Substituting it into
the rst-order condition for consumption ct leads to
q0t =
tuc (t)
uc (0)
1 +  c0
1 +  ct
: (44)
Putting equation (44) in equation (40), we obtain
q0t
Hx (t)
= q0t+1

Hh (t+ 1) + 1  h
Hx (t+ 1)
+
 
1  nt+1

wt+1Mh (t+ 1)

: (45)
Invoking the homogeneity of M and H, and substituting equations (38), (44) and (45)
into (43), we obtain the implementability condition
1X
t=0
t [uc (t) ct + uk (t+ 1) kt+1] = eA; (46)
8We derive the status-concerns model with both physical capital and human capital in Appendix B.
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where
eA  uc (0)
1 +  c0

Hh (0) + 1  h
Hx (0)
+ (1  n0 )Fe (0)Mh (0)

h0 +
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0

:
We dene
U

ct; nht; nmt; kt; ct+1; nht+1; nmt+1; kt+1; e = u (ct; 1  nht   nmt; kt)+e [uc (t) ct + uk (t+ 1) kt+1] ;
and formulate a Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
U

ct; nht; nmt; kt; ct+1; nht+1; nmt+1; kt+1; e+
t [F (kt;M (xmt; ht; nmt)) + (1  k)kt   ct   gt   kt+1   xmt   xht]
vt [(1  h)ht +H (xht; ht; nht)  ht+1]
9>=>;  e eA2:
The rst-order conditions for ct; nht; nmt; xht; xmt; kt+1 and ht+1 are
 [U1 (t)  t] + U5 (t  1) = 0; (47)
 [U2 (t) + vtHn (t)] + U6 (t  1) = 0; (48)
 [U3 (t) + tFe (t)Mn (t)] + U7 (t  1) = 0; (49)
t = vtHx (t) ; (50)
Fe (t)Mx (t) = 1; (51)
U8 (t)  t +  fU4 (t+ 1) + t+1 [Fk (t+ 1) + 1  k]g ; (52)
vt =  ft+1Fe (t+ 1)Mh (t+ 1) + vt+1 [Hh (t+ 1) + 1  h]g ; (53)
where
U1 (t) = uc (t) + eucc (t) ct + euc (t) ;
U2 (t) = U3 (t) =  ul (t)  eucl (t) ct;
U4 (t+ 1) = uk (t+ 1) + euck (t+ 1) ct+1;
U5 (t  1) = eukc (t) kt;
U6 (t  1) = U7 (t  1) =  eukl (t) kt;
U8 (t) = e [ukk (t+ 1) kt+1 + uk (t+ 1)] :
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3.2 Optimal taxation
In this subsection, we examine the limiting optimal taxes on capital income, labor income,
consumption and expenditures for generating e¤ective labor force, respectively.
Capital Income Tax
 
 k

. In the steady state, equation (52) turns out to

"
uk + e (ukkk + uk + uckc)

+ (Fk + 1  k)
#
= 1: (54)
Substituting equation (37) into equation (39) leads to


uk
ul
Hn
Hx
+
 
1   k

Fk + 1  k

= 1: (55)
Combining equations (54) and (55), we obtain the limiting tax rate for capital income
 k =
1
Fk
"
uk
ul
Hn
Hx
 
uk + e (ukkk + uk + uckc)

#
: (56)
From equation (47) or (49), we solve for the expression of , substitute them into (56) and
hence rewrite the expression for the limiting capital tax as follows:
 k =
FeMne
Fkul
"
uk (uclc+ uklk)  ul (ukkk + uk + uckc)
ul + e (uclc+ uklk)
#
;
which is very similar to the formula (30) of the baseline case without human capital. The
sign of the limiting capital tax depends on the numerator of the expression in the square
brackets, which also depends only on the utility functional form rather than the production
technology. However, we cannot determine the sign of the optimal capital income tax, which
may be positive, negative or zero.
Labor Income Tax (n). From (48) and (49), we know that in the steady state

v
=
Hn
FeMn
:
The substitution of equation (50) into the above equation yields
Hn
Hx
= FeMn: (57)
Meanwhile, the rst-order equation (37) of the representative consumer tells us
Hn
Hx
= (1  n)FeMn: (58)
If follows immediately from equations (57) and (58) that n = 0. Even though the optimal
tax on physical capital is indenite, the limiting tax on human capital (or labor income) is
denitely equal to zero.
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Taxing on Expenditures (m;  c). Given n = 0, conditions (38) and (51) imply that
m = 0. To derive the optimal consumption rax, we use equation (37) and n = 0 to get
1 +  c =
uc
ul
FeMn:
From equations (47) and (49), we have
FeMn =
ul + e (uclc+ uklk)
uc + e (uccc+ uc + ukck) :
Hence, we know from the above two equations
1 +  c =
uc
ul
ul + e (uclc+ uklk)
uc + e (uccc+ uc + ukck) ;
which displays that the limiting constumption tax is not zero in general.
Therefore, we have proved the following
Theorem 2 In the status-concerns model with both physical capital and human capital, the
limiting capital income tax can be positive, negative or zero; the optimal tax rates on
labor income and expenditures for generating e¤ective labor are both zeros; and the
limiting optimal consumption tax depends.
4 Heterogeneous agents
In this section we extend the model to more realistic settings with heterogeneous agents and
also show that the limiting capital income tax is not zero generally. Each agent is a point in
the unit interval [0; 1]. There are two types of agents, capitalists/entrepreneurs and workers,
with exogenously given weights  and 1   , respectively. Entrepreneurs save, trade with
the government and care about their social status. They do not work. Workers work for
salaries and derive utility from consumption and leisure. We use superscripts 1 and 2 to
denote capitalists and workers respectively. Both capitalists and workers discount the future
with a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). Firms hire labor from workers, rent capital from
capitalists and produce the nal goods with the linearly homogenous production technology
F (k1t ; n
2
t ).
The representative capitalist solves the following maximization problem:
max
fc1
t
;k1
t+1
;b1
t+1
g1
t=0
1X
t=0
tu1(c1t ; k
1
t );
s:t: c1t + k
1
t+1   (1  )k
1
t = (1  
k
t )rtk
1
t + bt  
bt+1
Rt
;
and the representative worker solves
max
fc2
t
;n2
t
g1
t=0
1X
t=0
tu2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t );
14
s:t:; c2t = (1  
n
t )wtn
2
t :
The government nances its expenditures fgtg
1
t=0 with tax revenues and one-period bonds
with a balanced budget constraint
gt = 
k
t rtk
1
t + 
n
t wtn
2
t +
bt+1
Rt
  bt:
And the resource constraint of the economy is
c1t + c
2
t + k
1
t+1   (1  )k
1
t + gt = F
 
k1t ; n
2
t

: (59)
From the rst order conditions for the representative capitalist, we have the consumption
Euler equation
u1c (t) = 

u1k (t+ 1) + u
1
c (t+ 1)

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + (1  )
	
; (60)
and the no-arbitrage condition
Rt =
(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  
1  u1k(t+ 1)=u
1
c (t)
:
The optimization of the representative worker is described by the static equation
u2l (c
2
t ; 1  n
2
t )
u2c(c
2
t ; 1  n
2
t )
= (1  nt )wt =
c2t
n2t
: (61)
The implementability condition can be derived as follows
1X
t=0
t[u1c(t)c
1
t + u
1
k(t+ 1)k
i
t+1] = u
1
c(0)f[(1  
k
0)r0 + 1  ]k
1
0 + b0g 
eA3: (62)
The Ramsey problem is to maximize a weighted sum of utilities with weights  on
capitalists and (1  ) on workers
max
fc1t ;c2t ;k1t+1;n2tg
1X
t=0
t

u1(c1t ; k
1
t ) + (1  ) u
2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t )

;
subject to the imc (62), the static optimization condition of the worker (61), i.e., u2c (t) c
2
t =
u2l (t)n
2
t , and the resource constraint (59). To solve it, we construct the Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t

u1(c1t ; k
1
t ) + (1  ) u
2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t )

+ b" 1X
t=0
t[u1c(t)c
1
t + u
1
k(t+ 1)k
i
t+1] 
eA3
#
+
1X
t=0
tt

u2l (t)n
2
t   u
2
c (t) c
2
t

+
1X
t=0
tt

F
 
k1t ; n
2
t

  c1t   c
2
t   k
1
t+1 + (1  )k
1
t   gt

;
where b, ftg1t=0 and ftg1t=0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (62), (61), and
(59), respectively. The optimality conditions for c1t , c
2
t , n
2
t , and k
1
t+1 are:
 + bu1c(t) + bu1cc (t) c1t + u1kc (t) k1t | {z }
%1
= t; (63)
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(1    t) u
2
c(t) + t

u2lc (t)n
2
t   u
2
cc (t) c
2
t
| {z }
%2
= t; (64)
(1    t) u
2
l (t) + t

u2ll (t)n
2
t   u
2
cl (t) c
2
t
| {z }
%3
= tFn (t) ; (65)

8><>:

 + bu1k(t+ 1) + bu1kk (t+ 1) k1t+1 + u1ck (t+ 1) c1t+1| {z }
%4
9>=>; = t t+1 [Fk (t+ 1) + 1  ] :
(66)
Suppose that the economy converges to an interior steady state. Combining the steady
state equations of (60) and (66) yields us
 k =
1
Fk
"
u1k
u1c
 
 + b

u1k  
b

%4
#
:
Solving equation (63) for

 + b = = 1  b%1= =u1c and putting it into the above
equation, we solve for
 k =
b

1
u1cFk
 
u1k%1   u
1
c%4

:
To search for the limiting labor income tax, we combine equations (64) and (65) to derive
u2l =u
2
c = (Fn   %3) = (   %2). Substituting it into the static optimization equation of the
representative worker, we obtain the formula for the limiting labor income tax
n =
%3   %2Fn
Fn

   %2
:
Therefore, we have the following
Theorem 3 Assume that there exists an interior steady state in the economy with hetero-
geneous agents. The limiting capital income tax can be positive, negative or zero, the
sign of which is determined completely by the utility function. The sign of the limiting
labor income tax is also indenite.
As is shown in Theorem 3, in the more realistic setting with heterogeneous agents, we
also overturn the Chamley-Judd result and establish that the sign of the optimal capital
tax depends on the particular form of the utility function. If entrepreneurs have no status
concerns, then the limiting capital tax will degenerates to zero, just as Judd (1985) has
shown.
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5 Conclusion
By introducing status preferences into the dynamic optimal tax theory, we reexamine the
Chamley-Judd results on optimal capital income taxation in the di¤erent settings utilized
extensively in the literature. Generally, zero limiting capital income tax does not hold in
these settings with status concerns. We examine not only the representative agent models
(with unique physical capital, with multiple physicla capitals, and with both human capital
and physical capital), but also the heterogeneous-agent model. In each case, we derive
explicitly the formula for optimal capital tax, the sign of which depends completely on the
particular specication of the very general utility function but not the production side of the
economy. The sign of the limiting capital income tax is indenite, that is, the limiting capital
income tax can be positive, negative or zero. This research puts forward a new channel to
overturn the Chamley-Judd theorem.
6 Mathematical appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Derive the baseline model
We rstly derive the present-value budget constraint. Repeated substitutions of equation
(5) from time 0 lead to
b0 =
1X
t=0
q0t
8><>:ct   (1  nt )wtnt + kt+1    1   kt  rt + 1   kt| {z }
xt
9>=>;+ limT!1 q0t bT : (67)
Then we derive the term
P1
t=0 q
0
t xt in the above equation (67)
1X
t=0
q0t xt =
1X
t=0
q0t

kt+1  
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
	
= lim
T!1
TX
t=0
q0t

kt+1  
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
	
= lim
T!1
(
TX
t=0
q0t kt+1  
TX
t=1
q0t
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
)
 
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0
= lim
T!1
T 1X
t=0

q0t   q
0
t+1
 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
	
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1
=
1X
t=0

q0t   q
0
t+1
 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
	
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1:
Substituting equations (6) and (9), we rewrite the modied no-arbitrage condition (12) as
follows:
Rt  

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k

=
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
:
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Multiplying both sides of the above equation with q0t+1 and using the denition of the Arrow-
Debreu price, we have
q0t   q
0
t+1

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k

= q0t+1
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
: (68)
Plugging (68) in the term
P1
t=0 q
0
t xt gives us
1X
t=0
q0t xt =
1X
t=0
q0t+1
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1:
Substituting the above result about
P1
t=0 q
0
t xt into equation (67) and imposing the transver-
sality conditions
lim
T!1
q0t bT = 0; lim
T!1
q0TkT+1 = 0;
we obtain the present-value budget constraint of the representative consumer
1X
t=0

q0t ct + q
0
t+1
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
kt+1

=
1X
t=0
q0t (1  
n
t )wtnt +
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0:
Then, substituting those price equations (18) and (19) into the present-value budget con-
straint (14) and rearranging, we have the implementability condition (21):
1X
t=0
t[uc(t)ct   ul(t)nt + uk(t+ 1)kt+1] = uc(0)f[(1  
k
0)r0 + 1  k]k0 + b0g  A:
6.2 Appendix B: Derive the model with human capital
Firstly, we derive the First-Order Conditions of the representative household. The La-
grangian is constructed as follows
L =
1X
t=0
t
8<:
u(ct; 1  nht   nmt; kt) + t [(1  h)ht +H (xht; ht; nht)  ht+1] +
t

(1   kt )rtkt + (1  
n
t )wtM (xmt; ht; nmt) + (1  k)kt + bt
  (1 +  ct) ct   kt+1   (1 + 
m
t ) xmt   xht  
bt+1
Rt
 9=; ;
where t and t are two Lagrange multipliers associated with the ow budget constraint and
the dynamic equation of human capital. The necessary conditions are
uc (t) = (1 + 
c
t)t; (ct) (69)
ul (t) = tHn (t) ; (nht) (70)
ul (t) = t(1  
n
t )wtMn (t) ; (nmt) (71)
t = tHx (t) ; (xht) (72)
(1  nt )wtMx (t) = (1 + 
m
t ) ; (xmt) (73)
t = 

uk(t+ 1) + t+1[(1  
k
t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
	
; (kt+1) (74)
t = t+1(1  
n
t+1)wt+1Mh (t+ 1) + t+1 [Hh (t+ 1) + 1  h] ; (ht+1)(75)
t
Rt
= t+1: (bt+1) (76)
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From equations (69)-(72), we have equation (37). Equation (73) is (38). Combining equations
(69) and (74) gives us the Euler equation (39). Substituting equations (69) and (70) into
(75) leads to (40). Equation (41) comes from equations (69) and (76). The no-arbitrage
condition (42) comes from equations (69), (74), and (76).
Secondly, the implementability condition can be derived by the following procedure.
Applying the homogeneity of H to equation (34) and solving for xht, we have
xht =
ht+1   [1  h +Hh (t)]ht
Hx (t)
:
Substitute the above expression for xht and the production technology of e¤ective labor into
the sum on the right side of equation (43), which then becomes
1X
t=0
q0t

(1  nt )wtMx (t) xmt + (1  
n
t )wtMh (t)ht   (1 + 
m
t ) xmt  
ht+1   [1  h +Hh (t)]ht
Hx (t)

;
where we have also invoked the homogeneity of M . First-order condition (73) implies that
the term multiplying xmt is zero, [(1  
n
t )wtMx (t)  (1 + 
m
t )] = 0. After rearranging, we
are left with 
(1  n0 )w0Mh (0) +
1  h +Hh (0)
Hx (0)

h0  
1X
t=1
ht

q0t 1
Hx (t  1)
  q0t

(1  nt )wtMh (t) +
1  h +Hh (t)
Hx (t)

:
However, the term in braces is zero by rst-order condition (45), so the sum on the right
side of equation (43) simplies to the very rst term in this expression. Then substituting
(44) into equation (43) gives the implementability condition (46).
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